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Abstract—The paper studies the problem of securely
storing biometric passwords, such as fingerprints and
irises. With the help of coding theory Juels and Wattenberg
derived in 1999 a scheme where similar input strings
will be accepted as the same biometric. In the same time
nothing could be learned from the stored data. They called
their scheme a fuzzy commitment scheme.
In this paper we will revisit the solution of Juels and
Wattenberg and we will provide answers to two important
questions: What type of error-correcting codes should be
used and what happens if biometric templates are not
uniformly distributed, i.e. the biometric data come with
redundancy.
Answering the first question will lead us to the search for
low-rate large-minimum distance error-correcting codes
which come with efficient decoding algorithms up to the
designed distance.
In order to answer the second question we relate the
rate required with a quantity connected to the “entropy”
of the string, trying to estimate a sort of “capacity”, if we
want to see a flavor of the converse of Shannon’s noisy
coding theorem.
Finally we deal with side-problems arising in a practical
implementation and we propose a possible solution to the
main one that seems to have so far prevented real life
applications of the fuzzy scheme, as far as we know.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally passwords for access to a computer are
not stored in plain-text but rather as images under a
hash function. Hash functions have the property that
they can easily be computed for any input string but
it is computationally not feasible to compute any pre-
image of a given image point. Usually it is also desirable
that hash functions are ‘collision resistant’, this means
it is computationally not feasible to come up with two
different input strings which are mapped to the same
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hash values. Because of the last property standard hash
functions such as SHA-1 are not suitable to store biomet-
ric data. What we would need is a hash function having
the property that similar input strings will result in the
same hash values. Until recently no good scheme has
been known and many practical systems store biometric
data such as fingerprints to access a personal computer
in plain-text.
Martinian, Yekhanin and Yedidia [21] call the problem
at hand the secure biometric storage problem. The prob-
lem arises when biometrics such as fingerprints and irises
are used instead of passwords. It is desirable for security
reasons that the biometric data is not stored in plain-text
on a storage device but rather in encrypted form. When a
user wants to access the system the access device should
grant access as long as two biometrics do not differ by
more than a certain amount of bits.
In the literature there are several schemes which use
ideas from coding theory to tackle the secure biometric
storage problem. According to the authors of [21] the
first solution was proposed by Davida, Frankel and
Matt in [6]. In their own paper [21] Martinian et. al.
propose an information theoretic solution based on the
Slepian-Wolf theorem. This system has the property that
the biometric is securely stored, it has however the
disadvantage that a person who has access to the stored
data and the implemented algorithm can compute a bit
string which will provide access to the system even
though the bit string is not close to any biometric data.
In this paper we will be concerned with an algorithm
first proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [17]. Also this
system makes heavily use of coding theory.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section
we revisit the algorithm of Juels and Wattenberg. The
original paper [17] leaves two important questions open.
First what are good practical codes to be used having
very large block length and which provide the robustness
and security level required for the secure biometric
storage problem. We provide answers to this problem in
Section III. The second question arises when the possible
biometric bit-strings are not uniformly distributed. Of
course this is an important issue as all practical systems
are suffering this problem. We will address this problem
in Section IV.
II. THE FUZZY COMMITMENT SCHEME OF JUELS
AND WATTENBERG
Juels and Wattenberg [17] proposed a ‘a fuzzy com-
mitment scheme’ capable of storing biometric data in
binary form. In this section we describe the scheme for
data over a general alphabet and we derive a strengthened
theorem.
Let F = Fq be a finite field. We assume that the
biometric data is given in form of a vector b ∈ Fn.
Assume C ⊂ Fn is an [n, k, d] linear code and distance
d is given by
d = 2t+ 1.
We also assume that there is an efficient decoding
algorithm capable of decoding up to t errors.
Let h : Fn −→ Fl be a hash function. In particular h
should be collision resistant and it should be computa-
tionally not feasible to compute an x ∈ h−1(y) for any
y ∈ Fl.
Let b ∈ Fn be the biometric one wants to store on
the computer. The algorithm requires to select a random
code word rb ∈ C. The system then computes the vector
l := b− rb
and stores on the system:
(h(rb), l).
The following is a strengthening of the main theorem
in [17].
Theorem 1: If the possible biometrics b ∈ Fn are
uniformly distributed then computing the biometric b ∈
F
n from the stored data (h(rb), l) is computationally
equivalent to invert the ‘restricted’ hash function
h |C : C −→ F
l.
Proof: Since b and rb were selected independently
and uniformly at random the vector l := b − rb reveals
no information about the random choice of rb ∈ C. An
attacker is left with the task to compute rb from h(rb).
The theorem provides the means to come up with a
practical secure storage system once we can assume that
the biometrics are uniformly distributed over the ambient
space Fn. If this is the case and if h is a hash function
which is practically secure then we only have to require
that the size of the code |C| ≥ 280. This is due to the
fact that it is generally accepted that a total search space
of 280 is beyond the capabilities of modern computers.
As a result it is desirable that the constructed codes have
dimension k = dimC ≥ 80.
The following lemma shows that the system allows to
accept an authorized user as soon as this user provides
a biometric vector which comes close enough to the
originally supplied vector b ∈ Fn.
Lemma 2: Let b˜ ∈ Fn be a vector whose Hamming
distance satisfies:
dH(b, b˜) ≤ t.
Then it is possible to efficiently compute b from the
stored data (h(rb), l). (In fact authorization is granted by
comparing the hash stored with the hash of the decoded
codeword, without any need to compute b.)
Proof:
dH(rb, b˜− l) = dH(b− l, b˜− l) = dH(b, b˜) ≤ t.
The vector b˜ − l decodes by assumption uniquely to
the code vector rb. Knowing rb and l is equivalent to
knowing b.
Several considerations are due at this moment, starting
with the choice of the code to use.
In [17] it is proposed that Reed-Solomon and BCH
codes might provide useful results (see also [14]). We
believe these are not necessarily good options for two
reasons. First practical biometric systems have often to
deal with large amount of bits (an estimate in some
circumstances could be 10′000 bits). Moreover we can
say an error tolerance of 10% of errors is a reasonable
requirement. BCH codes of block length 104 and dis-
tance 2′000 are necessarily of very low rate and it is
practically not feasible to run e.g. a Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm once so many syndromes are involved.
The next section addresses the choice of the code.
III. CHOICE OF THE CODE
Based on the comments in the last section we require
an [n, k, d] linear code whose dimension is k ≥ 80 over
the binary field, possibly smaller if one works over larger
alphabets. In addition one wants to have a large relative
minimum distance that only low rate codes can afford.
Indeed because e.g. of the asymptotic Elias upper bound
(see e.g. [1]) only very low rate binary codes can have
relative distance larger than e.g. 0.4. Of course the code
should come with efficient decoding algorithms even
when the block length is in the range of n = 104.
We think of two types of codes as possible candidates
for this application, namely 1) Product codes, and 2)
LDPC codes. Both these codes can be decoded with
linear or close to linear complexity in the block length.
Let us consider the first option: product of classical
codes. We can define them using the generator matrices
(see e.g. [20]): If A and B are the generator matrices of
two codes, C1 and C2, with parameters (n1, k1, d1) and
(n2, k2, d2), then the Kronecker product of matrices
A⊗B = (aijB)
obtained by replacing every entry aij of A by aijB is
the generator matrix of the product code.
The new code has parameters (n1n2, k1k2, d1d2) and
can be viewed as the set of all codewords consisting
of n1 × n2 arrays constructed in such a way that every
column is a codeword of the first code and every row is
a codeword of the second one.
Clearly, given the definition of the product of two
codes, the product of more than two codes can be defined
as well.
We give here some examples of product of two codes
with parameters getting close to (100000, 100, 20000):
• (512, 98, 93), a classical Goppa code and
(200, 1, 200), a repetition code.
• (121, 49, 37), an extended Goppa code [28] and
(825, 2, 550), where codewords are the all-zero
codeword, two codewords with respectively the first
and the last 275 bits equal to ones and the other
zeroes, and the sum of these two;
• (144, 50, 48), an extended Goppa code and
(693, 2, 462), where codewords are the all-zero
codeword, two codewords with respectively the first
and the last 231 bits equal to ones and the other
zeroes, and the sum of these two;
• (256, 26, 116), an extended Goppa code and
(400, 4, 200), an (8,4,4) extended Hamming code
with each symbol repeated 50 times.
The decoding procedure of such product codes is
based on iterative algorithms, where one decodes alterna-
tively by columns and by rows (see also [23], [24], [25]).
Thanks to this kind of splitting in the decoding, we can
afford to use classical codes such as Goppa codes, while
maintaining a reasonable computational complexity.
Since the first version of our paper was made available
at the arXiv a similar choice of coding scheme was
proposed in [15].
As for LDPC codes, the difficulty seems mainly that
of finding the parameters we need. Codes studied in the
literature often aim at rates of 1/2 or higher. Such codes
necessarily have a relatively poor relative minimum
distance
Among the many constructions in the literature, we
believe that RA, IRA and eIRA codes (see for ex-
ample [29], [31]) should be good candidates with this
respect. We have also taken into consideration the use
of algebraic constructions of LDPC codes, such as the
Margulis-Ramanujan type [30]: in this case we should
modify the construction to lower the rate, for example
by taking m + 1 copies of the graph on the left and m
on the right for a suitable m, but we face the difficulty
of finding a good minimum distance [19].
Actually turbo codes could be a better option for a low
rate; though in more pratical scenarios, as we will see in
next section, such low rates are not convenient anymore
for security reasons and more standard parameters suit
better.
IV. DISTRIBUTION OF BIOMETRIC TEMPLATES
Theorem 1 works under the strong assumption that
the biometric data is uniformly and randomly distributed
over the ambient space Fn. In practical applications this
is a very unlikely scenario. In this section we estimate a
threshold for the dimension k of the code, above which
the commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg is most
probably secure.
First note that if one has some information about the
biometric b it will be possible to recover from l some
information about rb. Dependent on the size of C it might
be possible to do a search among all codewords with a
particular pattern and consequently break the system. To
possibly defend the system from this attack, one could
essentially take a higher rate code (but at the expense
of lowering the minimum distance). So our next step is
to relate the uncertainty or randomness connected to the
string with the dimension required for the code.
Following [4], we can speak of the entropy of a binary
string as the log in base 2 of the number of possible
strings: so, for example, for a binary string of length n,
where each bit is chosen independently and randomly
between 0 and 1, the entropy is defined to be n and it
is measured in units of information or Shannon bits (see
e.g. [10]). If the string is not random, the entropy is the
log of the number of the so called typical sequences; if,
for example, each bit is chosen independently to be 1
with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p, then the
entropy of the string is nh(p), where h(p) = −[p log p+
q log q] is the Shannon function.
Now, let H(b) be the entropy of the biometric. If that
is n, that means that biometrics are randomly distributed,
then we can afford a code with dimension k = k0 (k0 =
100, say). When the distribution is not really random,
then the “number of possible strings” is reduced from
2n to 2H(b).
So, roughly speaking, it is like the eavesdropper Eve
knows the correct bit at n−H(b) positions, so that if we
want her to search nevertheless among 2k0 codewords,
then, counting in the worst case over all possible strings
for those positions, we should need 2k0 · 2(n−H(b))
codewords, i.e. the dimension should be
k ≥ k0 + (n−H(b)).
Clearly, as said, we are considering a worst case sce-
nario, so that this requirement makes sense for, let’s say,
reasonable values of the parameters, that is k0 << H(b);
otherwise k could be asked to be even larger than n.
Essentially our requirement is purposely asking a bit too
much than the strict minimum, which though doesn’t
waste at all in a security concern.
To see the issue from another view point, we can think
of a channel, where at one side we have the message rb
and at the other end there’s Eve which tries to decode and
get rb from the pair H(rb), l. The converse of Shannon’s
noisy coding theorem says that the probability of correct
decoding can be bounded as 2−nG(R) where G(R) is a
positive function of the rate R for R > C . So in some
sense we have estimated the capacity of this channel as
k0
n
+ 1− H(b)
n
.
(For references on information theory, Shannon’s
noisy coding theorem and its converse [5], [22], [32],
[33], [36].)
V. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The fact that, as far as we know, the fuzzy scheme
has not found yet so many real applications in biometric
storage, depends not only in the way of implementing it
as we have discussed it so far, but also in further practical
difficulties that make the problem more complicated than
how we stated it.
The main problem to overcome is the fact that the
scheme requires that the two passwords to be compared
are prealigned; and the difficulty consists in aligning with
a password that is not in the clear. There are also some
other aspects one has to improve or fix; for example
one has to take into account the possibility of erasures
and unordered collection of biometric features. The error
distribution is also far from uniform in practical schemes.
In the literature [2], [3], [7], [8], [16], [18], [34], [35],
[37] we can find a deeper discussion of all these side
problems together with proposals to attack some of them,
each of them with its pros and cons. In the following
section we propose another way of dealing with it, i.e.
we propose to use, instead of biometrics, some particular
histograms derived from them that can capture important
features of the images. As a side effect, since these
histograms are also a means of compression, we would
obtain smaller lengths for the passwords to be hashed and
also we wouldn’t need to require such a high minimum
distance. So looking for different and more convenient
code parameters could be a relevant consequence.
VI. HISTOGRAMS AND ALIGNMENT
What we essentially want to do to solve the pre-
alignment problem is to somehow transform the bio-
metric passwords and store the output of the transfor-
mation. What we first require from this “function” is
to be resistant to noise, changes in illumination and
transformations such as translation and rotation. The
literature [11], [12], [13] indicates that the so called
“multiresolution histograms”, that are sets of intensity
histograms of an image at multiple image resolution,
satisfy these prerequisites. So they could possibly solve
our problem, but we require another important feature,
i.e. we want the transformation to be one-to-one or at
least that not too many different biometrics give the same
output. Pass and Zabih [26], [27] worked in this direction
and introduced the notions of histogram refinement and
joint histograms. We believe that some transformation
of this kind that encompasses these features could be
a solution to overcome the problem of alignment. And
also new issues would consequently follow: the size of
error tolerance required (that would be much reduced)
and the choice of other suitable code parameters.
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